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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This is an appeal of the district court's order directing 
summary judgment for appellee, Ford Motor Company 
(Ford), and denying summary judgment for appellant, 
Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. (Liberty). Appellant challenges 
the district court's determination that, as a matter of law, 
Ford's Extended Service Plans (ESPs) are not included 
under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act (FPA). N.J. 
STAT. ANN. SS 56:10-1 to 10-15 (West 1999). Appellant also 
challenges the district court's dismissal of its additional 
common law and statutory claims. Additionally, appellant 
argues it is entitled to summary judgment against Ford 
because of Ford's refusal to pay the retail reimbursement 
rate under the FPA. 
 
The FPA obligates the franchisor to "reimburse each 
motor vehicle franchisee for such services as are rendered 
and for such parts as are supplied, in an amount equal to 
the prevailing retail price charged by such motor vehicle 
franchisee for such services and parts" in satisfaction of a 
warranty. S 56:10-15(a). Ford requires its dealers to repair 
and replace parts under both Ford's standard written 
warranties and Ford's ESPs, however, the reimbursement 
rate differs under each contract type. Ford reimburses 
dealers for standard written warranty repairs at the"retail 
rate" for the parts and work done. In 1991, Ford recognized 
Liberty's retail rate to be seventy seven percent over dealer 
cost. When a dealer performs ESP-covered repairs, however, 
it is reimbursed for labor at a prescribed labor rate 
multiplied by the applicable Ford Service Time Standard for 
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the repair involved. Dealers are reimbursed for parts 
supplied in performing ESP repairs according to formulae 
that provide for reimbursement at only thirty to forty 
percent markups over dealer cost depending upon the 
model year of the vehicle. 
 
The district court permitted the distinction in 
reimbursement rates between Ford's ESPs and standard 
written warranties because it characterized the Ford ESPs 
as service contracts and determined that there was a 
distinction under New Jersey law between service contracts 
and warranties. The district court concluded that"under no 
exercise of statutory construction can [Ford's ESPs] . . . fall 
within the purview of the [FPA]." Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 450, 457 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(Liberty III). 
 
We reject the district court's characterization of Ford's 
ESPs. This Court concludes an ESP contract may include 
warranty provisions that fall under the FPA because at 
least some of the ESPs cover defects in factory-supplied 
parts or workmanship, as do the standard warranties. 
Based on this conclusion, we must determine whether 
there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of 
material fact, a decision that turns, in part, on whether 
provisions of Ford's ESPs formed part of the basis of the 
bargain for sales of Ford vehicles. Because we find that 
provisions of Ford's ESPs may or may not have formed part 
of the basis of the bargain for sales of vehicles by appellant, 
we conclude there is a genuine issue of material fact, and 
summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for trial. 
 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
The facts of this case have been set forth in great detail 
in Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 923 F. 
Supp. 665 (D.N.J. 1996) (Liberty I), aff 'd in part, rev'd in 
part, rev'd and vacated in part on other grounds, 134 F.3d 
557 (3rd Cir. 1998) (Liberty II).1  The pertinent facts to this 
appeal are set forth below. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 134 F.3d 557 (3rd 
Cir. 1998), this Court applied the Franchise Practices Act (FPA), N.J. 
STAT. ANN. S 56:10-1 to 10-15 (West 1999), to Ford's reimbursement of its 
licenced franchised dealers who made repairs pursuant to warranties 
issued by Ford. 
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A. Standard Warranties 
 
Ford manufactures automobiles, including Lincoln and 
Mercury vehicles, and sells them through franchised 
dealers. Liberty is one such dealer. Ford's relationship with 
Liberty is governed by a Lincoln Sales and Service 
Agreement and a Mercury Sales and Service Agreement. 
Every vehicle Ford sells to its dealers for resale comes with 
a standard written Ford New Vehicle Limited Warranty 
(Standard Warranty). The Standard Warranty contains a 
bumper to bumper warranty that requires dealers to repair, 
replace or adjust all parts, except tires, of the vehicle sold 
that are defective with regard to factory-supplied materials 
or workmanship up to a specified period of years or 
mileage, whichever comes first. The Standard Warranty also 
covers safety belts and supplemental restraint systems. 
Body sheet metal panels are covered against corrosion for 
a limited period of time or miles, whichever comesfirst. The 
Standard Warranty's cost is built into the price of each new 
vehicle sold by Ford to the dealer and by the dealer to the 
end consumer. Purchasers of Ford vehicles do not pay any 
additional consideration for the Standard Warranty nor can 
they purchase new vehicles without the Standard Warranty. 
 
B. Extended Service Plans 
 
In addition to its Standard Warranty, Ford also offers a 
variety of ESPs which "protect owners against the 
repair/replacement costs of specific major components after 
warranty." For example, Ford's Base ESP "adds to [the] 
vehicle's standard 6/60 powertrain warranty, covering 
many more parts and repairs." The Base ESP "[c]overs 82 
major components against defects in factory-supplied 
materials or workmanship." Other ESPs also provide 
additional services such as coverage for scheduled 
maintenance services on covered components and 
replacement of certain items due to wear and tear. 
 
Ford sells ESPs to its participating dealers who, in turn, 
offer the ESPs for sale to owners of used and new Lincoln 
and Mercury automobiles. An ESP is purchased in a 
separate, optional contract, usually for additional  
consideration.2 An ESP may be transferred by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. There is at least one example in the record where as part of a 
promotion a Ford Extended Service Plan (ESP) contract appears to have 
been available without additional consideration. 
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purchaser to a subsequent purchaser of the vehicle only by 
paying a fee to Ford. Dealers do not have to sell Ford ESPs 
and may sell ESPs offered by other providers, including 
themselves. Some eighty percent of Ford dealers sell Ford 
ESPs, and around sixty percent of Ford dealers sell 
competing ESPs. An ESP purchaser may cancel a Ford 
ESP, and he will receive a refund of a portion of the ESP's 
purchase price. Finally, an ESP is not available for 
purchase after the Standard Warranty expires. 
 
Ford dealers must perform all Standard Warranty and 
ESP work on all Ford cars sold by a dealer. Dealers risk 
franchise termination if they refuse service. As with 
Standard Warranties, dealers must purchase all parts used 
for ESP repairs from Ford at prices set by Ford, and the 
dealer must absorb the attendant business costs, such as 
storage and inventory control, for those parts. Dealers 
seeking reimbursement from Ford for ESP repairs must use 
the same forms and processes for the submission of their 
claims as they use for their Standard Warranty claims. 
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
This Court's review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary. See Matthews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 
87 F.3d 624, 632 (3rd Cir. 1996). Circuit courts "owe no 
deference to district court adjudications of state law," 
Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 145 (1996), even though 
the district court may have "local expertise." Salve Regina 
College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 235-40 (1991). This Court 
must determine whether the record, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to appellant, Liberty, shows that there 
are no genuine issues of material fact and that appellee, 
Ford, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 
Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 980 (3rd 
Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322-23 (1986)). 
 
IV. THE FRANCHISE PRACTICES ACT 
 
The FPA requires franchisors to "reimburse each motor 
vehicle franchisee for such services as are rendered and for 
such parts as are supplied, in an amount equal to the 
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prevailing retail price charged by such motor vehicle 
franchisee for such services and parts." S 56:10-15(a). 
Reimbursement is required "[i]f any motor vehicle franchise 
shall require or permit motor vehicle franchisees to perform 
services or provide parts in satisfaction of a warranty 
issued by the motor vehicle franchisor." Id. In order to 
make a prima facie case under the FPA, a plaintiff must 
show that the services or parts for which it is seeking 
reimbursement at the retail rate were performed or replaced 
pursuant to an agreement that is a "warranty" under the 
FPA. 
 
The FPA does not define the term "warranty." In the 
absence of a specific statutory definition, the language of 
the statute should be given its "ordinary meaning and 
construed in a common sense manner to accomplish the 
legislative purpose." N.E.R.I. Corp. v. New Jersey Highway 
Auth., 686 A.2d 328, 335 (N.J. 1996) (quoting State v. 
Pescatore, 516 A.2d 261, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1996)); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Township Comm. 
of the Township of Manalapan, 658 A.2d 1230, 1239 (N.J. 
1995) (citations omitted). 
 
The district court found, and this Court agrees, that the 
ordinary definition of "warranty" is unhelpful in resolving 
the issue before the Court. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2578 (1981) defines "warranty" as: 
 
       [a] usu. written guarantee of the integrity of a product 
       and the good faith of the maker given to the purchaser 
       and generally specifying that the maker will for a 
       period of time be responsible for the repair or 
       replacement of defective parts and will sometimes also 
       provide periodic servicing. 
 
BLACK'S LAW D ICTIONARY 1586 (6th Ed. 1990) defines 
"warranty" as: 
 
        [a]n assurance or guaranty, either express in the 
       form of a statement by a seller of goods, or implied by 
       law, having reference to and ensuring the character, 
       quality, or fitness of purpose of the goods. A warranty 
       is a statement or representation made by seller of 
       goods, contemporaneously with and as a part of 
       contract of sale, though collateral to express object of 
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       sale, having reference to character, quality, fitness, or 
       title of goods, and by which seller promises or 
       undertakes to insure that certain facts are or shall be 
       as he then represents them. 
 
Therefore, contracts that only promise to repair certain 
parts of a vehicle and do not make any representations 
about the vehicle's "integrity," "character," "quality" or 
"fitness" would not appear to satisfy either of the above 
definitions. 
 
A "service contract," however, which is included as a 
subspecies of warranty under BLACK'S "extended service 
warranty" definition, is defined in BLACK'S as "[a] written 
agreement to perform maintenance or repair (or both) 
service on a consumer product for a specified duration. 15 
U.S.C.A. S 2301, See Warranty (Extended service warranty).3 
" Id. at 1369. Unlike warranties, service contracts do not 
need to have a representation about a good's quality, 
fitness or integrity and need not be part of the original 
contract of sale. Nevertheless, they are included as a 
subspecies of warranty under BLACK'S definition. Thus, it 
appears there is no bright line definition of the term 
"warranty."4 Since the term "warranty" in the FPA is not 
clear and the ordinary meaning is unhelpful, the Court 
should read the statute as a whole and read the FPA in 
"full light of its history, purpose and context." Koch v. 
Director, Division of Taxation, 1999 WL 14127, *3 (N.J. 
1999) (citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1587 (6th Ed. 1990) defines "extended service 
warranty" as a: 
 
       [t]ype of additional warranty sold with purchase of appliances, 
motor 
       vehicles, and other consumer goods to cover repair costs not 
       otherwise covered by manufacturer's standard warranty. Also known 
       as an extended services contract, such either extends the coverage 
       period or extends the range of potential defects covered beyond the 
       protection furnished in the contract of sale. 
 
4. The district court discussed at length the widespread confusion over 
the two terms and how "extended warranty" and"service contract" are 
often used interchangeably. See Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d. 450, 454 (D. N.J. 1998). 
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The legislative history of the FPA, however, offers little or 
no assistance in defining the term "warranty" under the 
FPA. See Legislative Statement, L.1977, c.84, S 3, Assembly 
No. 1956 (N.J. May 24, 1976). The legislative history speaks 
only to the purpose of the statute. The purpose is twofold: 
first, to "safeguard consumers;" and second, to "offer[ ] 
protection to the competent retailer against arbitrary 
actions by manufacturers." Id. This Court has held that the 
FPA is a "remedial statute intended to equalize the disparity 
of bargaining power in franchisor-franchisee relations." 
Liberty II, 134 F.3d at 566. Thus, the only legislative intent 
that can be discerned from the FPA's history is that the 
definition of "warranty" must be construed in a way that 
protects the "competent retailer" from "arbitrary actions by 
manufacturers." 
 
When the ordinary meaning of a statute and the statute's 
legislative history fail to provide sufficient guidance to a 
term's meaning, sound principles of statutory construction 
instruct the Court to look to other statutes pertaining to 
the same subject matter which contain similar terms.5 See 
2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
SS 51.01, 51.02, 51.03 (5th Ed. 1992). A prior statute's 
definition of the term will control if it is natural and 
reasonable to think that the members of the legislature, in 
drafting the new statute, were influenced by the prior 
statute. See id.; see also, e.g., In the Matter of Return of 
Weapons to J.W.D., 693 A.2d 92, 115-17 (N.J. 1997); State 
v. Brown, 126 A.2d 161, 166 (N.J. 1956). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The parties direct the Court's attention to four statutes, only one of 
which, the Uniform Commerce Code (UCC), the Courtfinds helpful. The 
first three statutes are the New Jersey New Vehicle Lemon Law (NVLL), 
N.J. STAT. ANN. SS 56:12-29 to 12-49 (West 1999), the New Jersey Used 
Vehicle Lemon Law (UVLL), N.J. STAT. A NN. SS 56:8-67, 56:8-67.1 (West 
1999), and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C.A. 
SS 2301-2312 (West 1999). The UVLL is unhelpful because it does not 
apply to new vehicles or new vehicle warranties. The NVLL is unhelpful 
because it uses the term "warranty" to define itself. See S 56:12-30. The 
MMWA is unhelpful because it is a federal statute and therefore does not 
speak to the intent of the New Jersey legislature with regard to the use 
of the term "warranty." The fourth statute is New Jersey's incorporation 
of the UCC and is addressed in the text. 
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The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is the law that 
governs commercial transactions in New Jersey and was 
incorporated into law in New Jersey before the FPA was 
enacted. See N.J. STAT. ANN . S 12A:1-102(2)(b) (West 1999). 
The UCC provides "unified coverage of its subject matter" 
and avoids repeals by implication. S 12A:1-104. The Court 
will use the UCC's definition of "warranty," see S 12A:2- 
313(1), to discern the meaning of "warranty" under the FPA. 
The Court uses this definition for two reasons.6 First, 
Article Two of the UCC applies to transactions in goods, see 
S 12A:2-102, and the "warranty" contemplated in section 
10-15 of the FPA is related to a sale of a good, a motor 
vehicle. Second, there is nothing in the FPA that explicitly 
repeals the UCC as to automobile warranties. 
 
We find the UCC's definition of warranty compelling and 
look to its elements to determine the definition of warranty 
under the FPA. Unlike the district court, however, we find 
that an ESP contract may include warranty provisions that 
fall under the FPA, notwithstanding the fact that the same 
ESP contract may also include service provisions. See, e.g., 
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 701 (N.J. 1969) 
(finding that a warranty exists "with no less force" in a 
"hybrid" sale and service contract "than it would have in 
the case of a simple sale"). We now turn to the elements of 
a warranty under the UCC. 
 
The New Jersey UCC defines "express warranties" as: 
 
       (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the 
       seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and 
       becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
       express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
       affirmation or promise. 
 
       (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The UCC definition of warranty is also instructive because the rules of 
statutory interpretation suggest that statutes with similar purposes be 
construed with reference to each other. See State v. DiCarlo, 338 A.2d 
809, 811 (N.J. 1975). Both the UCC and the FPA strive to protect 
consumers in their purchases. S 12A:2-312, Official Comment 4; 
Legislative Statement, L.1977, c.84, S 3, Assembly No. 1956 (N.J. May 
24, 1976). 
 
                                9 
  
       the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
       that the goods shall conform to the description. 
 
       (c) Any sample or model which is made part of the 
       basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that 
       the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or 




The UCC makes it clear that an express warranty is 
created when a promise is made by a seller to a buyer 
which relates to a good and becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain. See S 12A:2-313(1). The seller promises that 
the good sold will conform to some standard which may be 
established by a model, a level of quality, an assurance, a 
description or a list of specifications. The UCC does not 
require the use of formal words of promise or that the seller 
have a specific intention to warrant the good but rather 
that the substance of the sales agreement contains a 
promise of conformity as described above. See S 12A:2- 
313(2). 
 
The policy behind a warranty should also be taken into 
consideration when determining whether a warranty exists. 
Generally, the seller knows more about the good and is 
better able to absorb any loss resulting from a dangerous 
condition relating to the good than the buyer. See Cintrone 
v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Servs., 212 A.2d 769, 775 
(N.J. 1965) ("Warranties of fitness are regarded by law as 
an incident of transaction because one party to the 
relationship is in a better position than the other to know 
and control the condition of the chattel transferred and to 
distribute the losses that may occur because of a 
dangerous condition the chattel possess."). It must be 
emphasized, however, that not all promises of conformity to 
some standard are warranties; to be a warranty, the 
promise must also be part of the basis of the bargain for 
the purchase of the good. 
 
What constitutes "part of the basis of the bargain" is 
hard to define. See 3 MARY ANNE FORAN, WILLISTON ON SALES 
S 17-7 (5th Ed. 1994). The UCC does not define what 
constitutes "part" or "basis." This Court has held that a 
promise is presumed to be a "part of the basis of the 
 
                                10 
  
bargain" under New Jersey law "once the buyer has become 
aware of the affirmation of fact or promise . . . ." Cipollone 
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d. 541, 568 (3rd Cir. 1990), 
overruled on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The 
defendant may rebut this presumption by " `clear 
affirmative proof ' . . . that the buyer knew that the 
affirmation of fact or promise was untrue."7 Id. 
 
WILLISTON ON SALES notes that "bargain" does not refer to a 
specific fixed point in time but rather to the relationship 
between the parties to a commercial transaction. See 
WILLISTON ON SALES atS 17-7; see also, e.g., Autzen v. John C. 
Taylor Lumber Sales, Inc., 572 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Or. 1977) 
(The bargain relevant to the creation of a warranty under 
the UCC does not occur at any fixed point in time but 
"describes the commercial relationship between the parties 
as to the product."). Indeed, Official Comment Seven to 
section 2-313 of the UCC states that: 
 
       The precise time when words of description or 
       affirmation are made or samples are shown is not 
       material. The sole question is whether the language or 
       samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of 
       the contract. If language is used after the closing of the 
       deal . . . the warranty becomes a modification, and 
       need not be supported by consideration if it is 
       otherwise reasonable and in order (emphasis added). 
 
S 12A:2-313, Official Comment 7. Thus, the focus is not on 
any particular language at a particular point in time but 
whether the seller's actions or language when viewed in 
light of his relationship with the buyer were fairly regarded 
as part of the contract to purchase the good. 
 
Appellant, Liberty, argues that Ford's ESPs are always 
part of the basis of the bargain in the sale of Ford vehicles 
by Ford dealers and must be viewed either as part of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. This Court recognizes that reliance may become a factor in 
determining whether or not an affirmation of fact or promise is part of 
the basis of the bargain. If the defendant has proven non-belief, the 
plaintiff may still recover economic damages if he can prove reliance 
despite non-belief. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d. 541, 
568 n.31 (3rd Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, 505 U.S. 504 
(1992). 
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original contract or as a post-sale modification of the sales 
contract. Additionally, Liberty argues that Ford ESPs 
purchased after the original sale of the vehicle are valid 
post-sale modifications of the original sale and part of the 
basis of the bargain of the original sale because the initial 
transaction contained the opportunity to obtain a Ford ESP 
and that opportunity remains open as part of the 
transaction until the termination of the Standard Warranty. 
Liberty bases its assertions on Ford's promotional 
literature, the fact that ESPs are available only to 
purchasers of new Ford vehicles and the fact that Ford 
ESPs are specific to the particular vehicle sold. 
 
Appellee, Ford, argues that its ESPs are not part of the 
basis of the bargain in the sales of its vehicles since they 
are contracts separate from the sales agreements and 
require additional consideration. Given the definition of 
"warranty" discussed above, this Court finds that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether provisions in at 
least some Ford ESPs form a part of the basis of the 
bargain in the sale of a vehicle by appellant Liberty. As a 
result, this Court concludes that this case must be 




For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court's 
order of summary judgment and remand this case for a 
determination consistent with this opinion. 
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